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JOHN E. CRIBBET*
"While 'property rights' under American law enjoy a reputation for
permanence they are in fact more highly relative and more sensitive to
changing economic factors and social opinion than most other legal
concepts."' This is a theme that I have been fond of repeating in a series of
law review articles,2 casebooks, and textbooks. A dictum, engraved in
stone on one of the University of Illinois' buildings, proclaims: "The Past is
Prologue." The facade does not enlighten the viewer by indicating to what
the past is prologue, but presumably it is the future. To paraphrase
Professor C. Vann Woodward, Sterling Professor Emeritus of American
history at Yale: Law (he said history, of course) is an indispensable
mediator "between man's daydream of the future and his nightmare of the
past, or, for that matter, between his nightmare of the future and his
daydream of the past."'3 There is some irony in this because Professor
Woodward then recalled Paul Valery's melancholy dictum that, "The
future, like everything else, is not what it used to be."
Property law has quite a prologue for the Anglo-American lawyer and
most of its devotees are well-steeped in the feudal origins. Perhaps too
well, since we tend to find ourselves locked in the interstices of ancient
dogma. Whether our vision of the twenty-first century conjures up
daydreams or nightmares will depend to considerable extent on our own
natures. Are we basically pessimists or optimists? The nightmares of the
former will inevitably mirror T. S. Eliot's poem, 7he Rock, in which the
poet described the wind of the future blowing over a desolate wasteland.
"And the wind shall say here were decent, godless people / their only
monument the asphalt road and a thousand lost golf balls." The asphalt
roads and the lost golf balls we shall surely have, but I am an optimist
(most days) and my daydream, seen through a glass darkly, has its more
cheerful side. I foresee a property law more nearly fashioned to serve the
needs of a relatively free people, with less reification of the "thing" (land or
chattel) and more emphasis on the rights of society as a whole. The winds
of doctrine are not all blowing in that direction, but enough of the signs are
emerging so that I, for one, do not despair.
Simplicity versus Complexity
Property law has always been balanced on the razor's edge of
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simplicity versus complexity, free alienability versus family, corporate, or
governmental control. The dead hand that manipulates from beyond the
grave is familiar to generations of law students; the bureaucratic red tape
that entangles Blackacre in a myriad of land use and environmental
controls is becoming equally so. What primogeniture, the entailed estate,
and strict settlement were to common-law England, the comprehensive
plan and the environmental impact statement are rapidly becoming to
modern America. I do not wish to stretch the analogy too far, but there is
evidence that the seeds of the past are being fertilized by too great a reliance
on law as regulator of land use in the name of the greater social good.
The landed gentry, with aristocratic flair, tied up the English estates
and kept the common man from owning his piece of turf, dooming him to
the status of tenant with no real stake in the future of society. The leaders
of the infant American republic set about abolishing those indicia of the
ancient regime-primogeniture, fee tail, and others-thus enabling each
man to purchase his own fee simple absolute.
4
Today, the res is rather freely alienable, but the "kernel of enjoy-
ments," 5 covered by the shell of title, is shrinking. In this sense, the state
has replaced the landed gentry and is creating a status for land ownership
which contains echoes of the past. The bundle of rights that the individual
owner receives may, in many cases, be little more than the non-freehold
estate of our ancestors. The state is the landlord in a peculiar sense, and
this has profound significance for the twenty-first century. This perspec-
tive is best understood when viewed from Scandinavia. Stockholm owns
the land within the city limits, and beyond, and leases it to the individual.'
Although the latter receives a long term lease it is not too different from the
American fee simple, with the rent approximating taxes. This develop-
ment in American law is either "good" or "bad," depending on your point
of view, but it will clarify our thinking if we see it with the blinkers off.
Alienability- The Trend Toward Simplicity
While property law contains many strands, this short essay concen-
trates on two principal threads as it analyzes the future-alienability and
land use. Herein lies a dichotomy. Land transfer is moving toward
simplicity while land use heads toward ever greater complexity. I foresee,
and view favorably, a much simpler system of land transfer in the next
century. Land remains static-the great immovable-but people do not.
4. For a vivid account of one statesman's efforts, see I N. SCIIA.TIINESR, T IOMv m tIRON 146
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Their very mobility, which will undoubtedly continue to increase under the
impact of speedier and cheaper means of transportation and access to job
markets, will cause them to demand a responsive mechanism for property
transfer. The legal technicalities will become less like Professor McDou-
gars "aboriginal, ritualistic clambake 7 and will resemble much more the
sale of a chattel, such as an automobile or a boat. The lawyer's role will
probably be less important, except in the major transactions, and much of
our current learning will become another item for the museum. Even
transfer on death will become a less cumbersome process with a reduction
in both the time lag and the legal expense. Lawyers, of course, will not
starve; they will simply turn their talents to other matters in the property
field and outside it.
I have some confidence in this prediction because the trend is so
clearly underway and the forces are so inexorable. I see no American
revival for the Torrens system, unless we colonize the moon, Mars or some
other planet and decide to utilize the best method of land transfer available
to the English-speaking world, but I do foresee a simplification of our
present methods and a universal use of computerized techniques which will
give us instantaneous access to the needed data. This, coupled with
various types of title insurance-lawyer cooperative, proprietary com-
pany, and others-will provide the consumer with a degree of title security
hitherto unknown. The scope of that title may be another matter,
however.
There may not be a federal law of land, the states are too entrenched
for that even in the twenty-first century, but the state laws will become
more uniform and the diversities in this area will tend to disappear. The
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has
already adopted several key acts-the Uniform Land Transactions Act,
the Uniform Simplification of Land Transfers Act, and the Uniform
Condominium Act-which contain the nucleus of this development.
True, they have yet to be adopted by the states, but these, or similar
statutes, will find their place beside the Uniform Commercial Code as the
legal arbiters of the new simplicity. Merchantability of title acts and
shortened and improved statutes of limitation, as long suggested by
Professor Paul Bayse,8 will end the laborious search for"fly specks" all the
way back to the patent deed. The archaic defeasible fees will either be
abolished as a matter of social policy (which England has already done) or
be so truncated by short statutes of limitation that they will cause few title
problems. Only the current, active claims against the land will survive,
and they will be so easily discoverable by modern data retrieval methods
that the key problem will be to see that they are satisfied before the title is
transferred. As a teacher of real property, I shed a tear for the demise of
7. McDougal, Title Registration and Land Reform: A Reply, 8 U. Cn. L. RE,,. 63,65 (1940).
8. P. BAYSE, CLEARING LAND TITLES (2d ed. 1970).
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these and other hoary chestnuts, such as privity, the Rule in Dumpor's
case,9 and covenants running with the land at law, but then I shall not be
around in the twenty-first century to ply my trade on each new generation
of unsuspecting students.
What will be the fate of that capstone of property law, the Rule
Against Perpetuities? Perhaps it will be around not only in the twenty-
first century but in perpetuity. After all we can overdo simplification, and
we need to retain some vestige of our learned profession in order to confuse
the engineers. In any event, out of deference to Professors Casner and
Powell, I think we should all wait and see!
Land Use Controls-The Trend Toward Complexity
Since many people tend to speak or write with the greatest assurance
in areas where they have the greatest doubts,' 0 I should proceed at this
point with maximum conviction. I am certain that an old truth is at work
in the area of land use regulation: the greater the demand for a scarcity, the
more complex the rules which allocate its use. This is particularly
demonstrable in water law. In the Eastern states, with ample rainfall, the
riparian doctrine prevails and the law is relatively simple (or even non-
existent); in the Western states, with arid conditions, prior appropriation
reigns and the law is far more technical and complex. To the extent that
water shortages and pollution problems increase in the East, it is inevit-
able that water law will become more complex. The principle at work
here applies with full force in the regulation of land use, particularly in
urban areas.
Will this trend toward complexity continue so that by the twenty-first
century land use regulations will replace title problems as grist for the
lawyer's mill? I suspect that it will and that the individual land owner will
be treated more as a life tenant who holds his estate in trust for the benefit
of future generations rather than as one seised of a free simple absolute in
the current sense. Here again, a common-law analogy appears. The life
tenant was answerable to the remainderman or reversioner for waste, and
the courts policed his use of the land to see that the freehold was not
impaired. Substitute the state for the holder of the -future interest and the
various police power controls for the remedy of waste and the picture is
complete. This substitutes the social policy of the state for the relatively
simple rules of the common law and allows the government, rather than
the economics of the market place, to determine the uses which can be
made of the land."
9. 4 Coke 1196, 75 Eng. Rep. 1110 (K. B. 1603).
10. The French poet Alain said: "Doubt follows certainty as closely as a shadow."
11. Of course, there are counter doctrines at work that argue for a return to the earlier
approach. See, e.g., B. SIEGAN, LAND USE WITHOUT ZONING (1972).
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The issue of the content of a fee simple absolute lies at the heart of this
development. It has long been assumed that land can be regulated under
the police power of the state, without compensation, since the public
welfare is involved. If, however, the land is taken for a public purpose or
public use, fair market value must be paid due to constitutional
guarantees. When the regulation becomes so extreme that the landowner
is deprived of virtually all economic use and is left only with the duty to pay
taxes, most courts have held that the police power controls were invalid.
The border between regulation and taking is not a thin red line but a broad,
gray area with the results always in doubt. Moreover, the decision has
traditionally been an either/ or proposition, and payment is made in full or
not at all. Professor John J. Costonis has argued brilliantly for a new
approach to this dilemma, which he calls the accommodation power. 12
His analysis of the problem is sound but his solution would be difficult for
the courts to apply, and I suspect we will continue in the old mold, with
some alleviation of the landowner's difficulties through the doctrine of
inverse condemnation.1
3
If I am correct, the content of the fee simple absolute will remain a
critical problem in the twenty-first century. The state will continue to
believe that it must regulate for the benefit of present and future citizens,
and I suspect that population growth, an ever-increasing technology, and a
stable land supply will increase the pressures for state intervention. At the
same time, fiscal problems will make it even more difficult for the state to
pay for what it takes (regulates). Since, in the final analysis, property is
what the law says it is,' 4 and the state makes the law, it is likely that the fee
simple will be gradually redefined to cut down on the private rights that
previously constituted the principal portion of the bundle of sticks.
As long as the fee simple absolute is viewed as a cluster of essentially
private rights, the state cannot interfere too much with these rights without
providing substantive due process; that is, if the state "takes" an easement
of access or, under the guise of regulation, reduces the private rights to the
vanishing point, compensation must be paid. But if the law comes to view
the owner as holding an interest more akin to a life estate, then society's
rights may be seen as already in the public domain, and no taking will be
12. Costonis, "Fair" Compensation and the Accommodation Power:Antidotes for the Taking
Impasse in Land Use Controversies, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1021 (1975). Professor Costonis has done
seminal thinking in this entire area, including work on transfer development rights. SeeCostonis, The
Chicago Plan: Incentive Zoning and the Preservation of Urban Landmarks, 85 HARv. L. RE''. 574
(1972); Costonis, Development Rights Transfer: An Exploratory Essay, 83 YALE L. J. 75 (1973). See
also J. COSTONIS, SPACE ADRIF LANDMARK PRESERVATION AND THE MARKETPLACE (1974).
13. "Inverse condemnation is the popular description of an action brought against a
governmental entity having the power of eminent domain to recover the value of property %hich has
been appropriated in fact, but with no formal exercise of the power." Thornburg v. Port of Portland,
233 Or. 178, 180, 376 P.2d 100, 101 (1962).
14. "Property and law are born together, and die together. Before las were made therew as no
property; take away laws, and property ceases." J. BENTHAM, TmEORY OF LEGIsLATIO N 113 (1908).
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involved. Thus, the principal requirement may come to be procedural
due process, and if the proper procedure-for example, notice and public
hearing-tis followed, the courts may be reluctant to interfere under the
old rules. Already this trend seems to be in evidence, and it could be the
wave of the future. By the twenty-first century, land may be viewed more
as a social commodity with the state being relatively free to control land
use to protect the environment, preserve the natural resources, or conserve
the shore lines. This would be in accordance with the current English
position in which the landowner must convince the planning authorities
before any new development can proceed. This is a reversal of the
historical view that starts with maximum private rights that must be taken
from the individual. It leaves the "owner" in the position of having the
burden of proof if he is to improve his acre in accordance with his personal
whim. Of course, it also redefines the nature of ownership even if the term
fee simple absolute remains the symbol of the highest quantum of rights
which the law allows.
I find it difficult to be optimistic about this growing complexity and
the corresponding diminution in private decision-making about land use.
A beneficient, all-wise state may make better decisions about the social
good than individuals can make, but there is little in human history to
indicate that this is so. Bureaucratic decision-making has its own flaws,
and they are readily apparent to those who have had experience with the
process. 16 Nonetheless, I am predicting what property law will be like in
the twenty-first century, not trying to fashion a system more to my own
liking. If this is the direction we are moving, then the law schools have an
even greater obligation to educate statesmen of property who can help
fashion a reasonable legal process that will give the maximum possible
protection to the individual while furthering the social goals implicit in a
wise use of our greatest natural resource-land.
Disparate Threads in the Crystal Ball
Property law encompasses much more than the transfer of ownership
and land use. I have concentrated on those two strands of the seamless
web because this must be a short essay, not a major law review article, and
the changes to be expected in those two areas are likely to be the most
significant developments for the new century.
Personal property law seems relatively stable, now that the Uniform
Commercial Code has swept the nation. Terrified foxes and lost and
found articles will undoubtedly continue to plague first-year law students,
but I doubt if the law will provide any more clear-cut answers then than
15. For a good analysis of the requirements of procedural due process in the land use area, see
Mr. Justice Stevens' dissent in City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc. 42 l.S. 668 (1976),
16. The author spent six years on the Champaign Plan Commission. He was enlightened but
not encouraged by the experience.
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now. Inter vivos gifts of property interests will still rise or fall on the
concept of delivery, but courts will probably continue to disagree whether
there must be a manual tradition or only a clear manifestation of intent
with some "delivery peg" on which the judge can hang his hat.
The doctrines of estates in land will be studied for their historical
significance and their pre-eminent value as tools of legal analysis, but they
will have even less effect on actual decisions. Concurrent estates will still
be in vogue except that the tenancy by the entirety will vanish into well-
deserved obscurity under the assault of women's rights. In fact, the last
vestiges of property law discrimination against women and racial or
religious minority groups will join curtesy and dower as unread footnotes
in books on legal history. The Statute of Uses will survive as an
introduction to trust doctrine, and that body of law will become more
important than ever as individuals free themselves from the burden of
managing their own wealth and rely increasingly on their privileged role as
cestuis que use. The Statute of Wills shall always be with us, but the
probate of an estate will join the inter vivos transfer as a simpler, cheaper,
faster transaction in the bright new world.
The non-freehold estate will come into its own. Gone will be Mr.
Justice Holmes' aphorism; "But the law as to leases is not a matter of logic
in vacuo; it is a matter of history that has not forgotten Lord Coke."'7
Lord Coke and ancient property dogma will be forgotten as contract
principles prevail and the tenant assumes a protected status as an equal to
the landlord. The diminishing fee will be further eroded as the lease
becomes more like "true" ownership and, at times, it will be difficult to say
who has the greater bundle of sticks, the landlord or the tenant. Even
today, the long-term leasehold is a major form of land holding with great
advantages in terms of financing, land use control, and investment
opportunities. Tenants are harder to evict, and courts are recognizing
that the leaseholder has a stake in his non-freehold estate that may be as
great as that of the lessor. Sophisticated drafting and negotiation are
required for the protection of all parties to the transaction, and this phase
of property law will assume ever greater importance for the practitioner.
The rights in the land of another (easements, profits, and equitable
servitudes) and the so-called natural rights to the support of land, freedom
from nuisance, air and water rights, and others, will assume increased
importance as individuals attempt to control their own fate in a world
more dominated by governmental paternalism. The "private law of the
tract" that developed through the use of protective covenants will become
more sophisticated but will continue to yield to the public conception of
how land should be used. Water law, like land use regulations, will
17. Gardiner v. Butler & Co., 245 U. S. 603, 605 (1918).
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become more complex, and the riparian doctrines will fade into permit
systems modeled on prior appropriation doctrines. Mineral law, too, will
become more a matter of public regulation as private rights play a lesser
role in the decision-making process. Weather modification will probably
become a scientific reality and complex rules will be needed to handle the
resulting legal problems. Regional compacts will play a role similar to
drainage districts since judge-made, ad hoc decisions will be inadequate to
deal with so vast a problem. Such perennial favorites as the Statute of
Frauds, covenants for title, and contract doctrines relating to vendor and
purchaser will still provide some grist for the litigation mill, but they will
have little consequence in the broader scheme of the law.
Conclusion
This short essay on property law in the twenty-first century has
attempted the impossible. Law reflects society more than it molds it.
Law is a principal ingredient -in any civilized state, but many other
elements are also involved and a successful seer would have to understand,
and predict, the shape of those elements as well. An all-out atomic war
could return society to the chaos of the Middle Ages and doctrines of
feudalism with the obeisance of the weak to the strong and could make
ancient doctrine more relevant than anything I have predicted. In that
case, society would once again have to struggle up from the depths and
fashion a law to provide some order so that the race could survive. But I
am an optimist, as I said before, and I prefer my daydream of the future to
some one else's nightmare of total holocaust.
Fortunately, in the crystal-gazing business an exact photograph is not
required; this essay is more in the style of the French impressionists." If
these comments reflect, even in an obscure way, one man's vision of the
future they may serve the purpose of the planners of this symposium,
They may also encourage others, at least in their private thoughts, to
dream of the new century and plot their own fears and hopes for the
unknown future.
18. lam reminded of John Ruskin's favorable criticism of the English impressionist. Turner, us
opposed to more realistic artists: "A photograph is no more true than an echo."
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